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Abstract
Background: Performance-based financing (PBF) has attracted considerable attention in recent years in low and
middle-income countries. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) implemented a PBF programme between
2010 and 2015 to strengthen the utilisation of maternal and child health services in primary health facilities. This
study aimed to examine the political economy factors influencing the adoption, design and implementation of the
PBF programme in Afghanistan.
Methods: Retrospective qualitative research methods were employed using semi structured interviews as well as a
desk review of programme and policy documents. Key informants were selected purposively from the national level
(n = 9), from the province level (n = 6) and the facility level (n = 15). Data analysis was inductive as well as deductive
and guided by a political economy analysis framework to explore the factors that influenced the adoption and
design of the PBF programme. Thematic content analysis was used to analyse the data.
Results: The global policy context, and implementation experience in other LMIC, shaped PBF and its introduction
in Afghanistan. The MoPH saw PBF as a promise of additional resources needed to rebuild the country’s health
system after a period of conflict. The MoPH support for PBF was also linked to their past positive experience of
performance-based contracting. Power dynamics and interactions between PBF programme actors also shaped the
policy process. The PBF programme established a centralised management structure which strengthened MoPH
and donor ability to manage the programme, but overlooked key stakeholders, such as provincial health offices and
non-state providers. However, MoPH had limited input in policy design, resulting in a design which was not well
tailored to the national setting.
Conclusions: This study shows that PBF programmes need to be designed and adapted according to the local
context, involving all relevant actors in the policy cycle. Future studies should focus on conducting empirical
research to not only understand the multiple effects of PBF programmes on the performance of health systems but
also the main political economy dynamics that influence the PBF programmes in different stages of the policy
process.
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Introduction
Performance-based financing (PBF) has become a
popular financing mechanism in low and-middle in-
come countries (LMICs) in the past 15 years [1]. PBF
is defined as a cash payment issued after attaining
and verifying predefined results [2]. PBF in the health
sector comprises direct payments to health profes-
sionals such as doctors, nurses, and community health
workers [3–6], organisations such as health facilities
or medical groups [7], and government or non-
government entities, typically based on quality and/or
utilisation outcomes [8]. Those paying can be govern-
ments, donors, or insurance programmes [9]. PBF is
seen not only as a tool to increase the motivation of
healthcare workers and improve health systems per-
formance but also a strategic purchasing reform [10].
PBF aims to improve outcomes by motivating health-
care workers through incentives [11], introducing a
results-based culture where ‘doing business as usual’
is no longer the norm [12]. The introduction of PBF
is supposed to generate a competitive environment
which will motivate healthcare organisations to ex-
hibit enhanced efficiency, high-quality services and
improved results [13–16]. PBF is expected to change
governance arrangements, strengthening relationships
between levels of the health system, and improving
regulation of the health sector and health financing
[17–21].
Political economy analysis (PEA), which studies
power and resource distribution and contestation, the
roles played by different actors and their interactions,
and how this shapes programmes and policies [22–24],
is well suited to the study of PBF. While PBF can influ-
ence the behaviour of healthcare professionals, it can
also affect the behaviour of other relevant actors and
their relationships between each other [25]. Due to its
innovative nature, PBF enforces distinct arrangements
for the sharing of resources; and represents a risk or
opportunity to actors as a result of changes to their
roles and responsibilities and the modification of or-
ganisational processes [26]. Consequently, a new polit-
ical and economic environment comes into existence.
Nevertheless, minimal information is available regard-
ing the political processes and interactions associated
with PBF in addition to the factors that influence the
choice and application of such policies. To date, only a
limited number of PEA have been conducted on PBF
programmes in low-income settings and fragile and
conflict-affect states (FCAS) [27–31]. These studies
partially examined political economy factors underpin-
ning the adoption and implementation of PBF [29, 31],
PBF policy processes [30], interaction between struc-
ture (historical legacies, context, institutions) and
agency (agendas, actors, power relationships)
concerning the implementation of incentive-based pol-
icies [27], and interplay between actors in formulating
and implementing PBF programmes [28]. To the best
of our knowledge, there is only one study concentrated
on the political economy of PBF in a comprehensive
manner from a low-income setting [31]. There is no
study from FCAS. This justifies the need for a compre-
hensive application of PEA for PBF in low-income set-
tings, especially FCAS. A PEA approach was used to
understand the factors (context, actors, processes) in-
fluencing the PBF adoption, design and implementation
in Afghanistan, and examine why the PBF programme
in Afghanistan did not have intended effects.
To strengthen maternal and child health services, the
Ministry of Public Health of Afghanistan (MoPH) with
financial support from the World Bank (WB) imple-
mented a PBF programme between 2010 and 2015 [32].
This programme provided incentives to healthcare
workers to achieve improved coverage of essential ma-
ternal and child health services [33]. The programme
had some effects on the utilisation and quality of health
services; however, these changes were not statistically
significant [34], and the programme was not cost-
effective [35]. Therefore, the purpose of this study was
to examine the political economy factors influencing the




In 2003, Afghanistan introduced the Basic Package of
Health Services (BPHS) to ensure equitable access to
a core set of health services in remote and under-
served populations [36]. The BPHS has been
contracted out by non-state providers (NSPs) in 31 of
its 34 provinces while the BPHS was provided by the
direct implementation of MoPH known as the “Minis-
try of Public Health Strengthening Mechanism”
(MoPH-SM) in three provinces [37]. Under the
MoPH-SM arrangement, provincial health offices were
contracted by the central MoPH to provide BPHS
services in those provinces [38].
The introduction of these reforms saw a substantial
reduction in under-five and infant mortality rates from
257 to 165 per 1000 live births in 2001 to 97 and 76
per 1000 live births in 2010, and maternal mortality
also declined substantially from 1600 to 2002 [39] to
327 per 100,000 live births in 2010 [40]. However,
maternal and child mortality remain high compared at
the regional level.
The PBF programme was initiated in 2010 in the con-
text of BPHS to improve maternal and child health. In
total, 463 health facilities in 11 out of 34 provinces were
included in the programme. The PBF programme
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targeted the following maternal and child health services:
antenatal care, delivery by skilled birth attendant, post-
natal care, and pentavalent vaccination. Health workers
were provided incentives based on extra production of
outputs (targeted services) above the baseline reported by
health information management system (HMIS) and veri-
fied by a third party (Fig. 1). Verification of the HMIS data
occurred on a regular basis on a random selection of PBF
health facilities and households. The PBF programme was
evaluated by means of two household surveys: a baseline
survey in 2010 and an end-line survey in 2015. House-
holds living within the catchment area of a facility exposed
to PBF were interviewed together with those living in the
catchment area of control health facilities [32].
Conceptual framework
A conceptual framework based on Buse et al. [23] was
adapted to guide our data collection and analysis. Our
framework helps understand the fundamental dynamics
that influenced the PBF programme adoption, design
and implementation. Our framework characteristics are
as follows:
1. Context: Understanding the contextual factors such
as social, economic and political setting as well as
global factors which influence the adoption of PBF
programme in Afghanistan.
2. Actors: Identifying the role, power, interest, and
ideas of actors in relation to PBF and the extent to
which they were involved in and affected the
adoption, design and implementation of PBF. Power
is considered to be the capability of agents to
accomplish results in social practices [41], whether
they are competing against each other or acting
collaboratively. Power is acknowledged to be
significantly influential on the process of developing
and implementing policies [42]. Interest is
considered to be the desire to do a particular thing.
Those who are capable of influencing policy do this
with the intention of enhancing their political and
or economic interests. Actors who are not in
government could have a specific interest in
economic outcomes, whereas government actors’
interest might be driven not only by their personal
economic interest but also their political interests,
particularly in terms of sustaining their hold on
power. Idea is consistently a key driver of policy,
along with direct political or economic concerns. In
situations where people can not rationally decide,
idea provides directions in terms of the actions they
should take to ensure consistency with their
fundamental values and beliefs in life [43].
3. Process: The official PBF programme design and
how it was implemented in practice, including
nonconformities to the initial design and reasons
for these.
Figure 2 presents the conceptual framework compo-
nents and the interactions between actors and context in
the adoption stage, between actors and process in the
design and implementation stage. The framework takes
the position that the dynamics between actors and the
context in which PBF came into existence (adoption)
and the process through which PBF programme was de-
signed and implemented had influenced the perform-
ance of the PBF programme and subsequently the
results.
Fig. 1 Afghanistan PBF programme arrangements
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Study Sampling
Key informants, who have especially informed viewpoints on
the PBF programme, were selected purposively from each
level of the health system. At the national level, respondents
were interviewed from the MoPH who managed the PBF
programme, the World Bank who funded the PBF
programme, the third party who conducted the PBF
programme monitoring and data verification, and non-state
providers (NSPs) who implemented the PBF programme in
the BPHS health facilities. At the province level, health man-
agers (HM) who were supervising the implementation of
PBF programme were interviewed. At the facility level,
healthcare workers (HW) who were providing healthcare ser-
vices at health facilities were interviewed. Two provinces
(Takhar and Balkh) were selected based on variations in
population ethnicity and health facility geographical location.
In total, 15 public primary care health facilities were selected
that comprised urban (n= 5), semi-urban (n= 5), and rural
health facilities (n= 5). In total, we interviewed 30 key infor-
mants, from national level (n= 9), from province level (n= 6)
and facility level (n= 15) (Table 1).
Data Collection
This study adopted retrospective qualitative research
methods and conducted a review of documents related
to Afghanistan’s PBF programme.
Qualitative interviews were designed with semi-
structured questions and probes and were conducted in
participants’ offices and health facilities over the phone
by the principal investigator (PI). Interviews with the
third-party evaluation organisation who conducted the
PBF programme monitoring and data verification and
donors were conducted in English and the rest were
conducted in the local languages. Where respondents
consented, a digital recording device was used to record
interviews (n = 24), while notes were taken in six out of
30 interviews. All recorded interviews were transcribed
verbatim by the PI. The research framework guided the
questions, which focused on three major areas – the
PBF programme context, actors and implementation
process.
For the document review, the PI reviewed minutes of
PBF coordination meetings and workshops, monitoring
visit reports, PBF progress reports, donor mission re-
ports (aide memoire), health facility and household sur-
vey reports from the impact evaluation, and published
literature on Afghanistan’s PBF scheme.
Data analysis
The data analysis was inductive as well as deductive, and
it was following the objective of the study and our con-
ceptual framework. ‘Content analysis’ was used to ana-
lyse the data [44]. First, all transcriptions and notes were
carefully reviewed. Key themes were highlighted from
Fig. 2 The study conceptual framework
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the conceptual framework. Based on their relationships,
data were selected and accommodated under specific
thematic classes. Information on the same opinion was
combined, and quotes were copied under the relevant
classifications. Finally, each classification was studied
and interpreted carefully. Common viewpoints between
key informants were then described and important
responses elucidated. A similar approach was used to in-
corporate the concerned content of reviewed documents
under the related thematic classes. The findings from in-
terviews were triangulated with other data sources (PBF
document review, published literature review).
Results
The respondents reported an age range from 26 to 59
years. All of them were married. Men and women com-
prised 60 % and 40 %, respectively, with education back-
ground from undergraduate to doctoral degree and
experiences from 4 years to 35 years.
PBF Programme Context
There was a range of contextual factors contributing to
the introduction of the PBF programme in Afghanistan.
First, at the global level, focusing on ‘results’ is a funda-
mental ideological shift from input-based financing to
outputs and outcomes. PBF was regarded as an innova-
tive solution to help utilize limited resources effectively
and efficiently [21], and make progress towards global
health goals: initially MDGs 4 and 5 [45], and subse-
quently Universal Health Coverage (UHC) [46]. There-
fore, an increasing number of developing countries were
adopting PBF schemes, and it was seen by local stake-
holders to be desirable to join this global movement.
“The funding trend at the global level was towards
PBF programmes and Afghanistan could not miss
this opportunity” [PM, National level).
Second, at the local level, maternal mortality ratio was
considered one of the highest worldwide at 1600 per
100,000 live births [39], contraceptive use was at 15 per
cent, ANC use was at 36 per cent, and full immunisation
was only at 37 per cent [47]. The World Bank first advo-
cated for the idea of a PBF programme in Afghanistan,
based on the positive experience of improving maternal
and child health outcomes in Rwanda using PBF.
“PBF was not a recognized term in the Ministry
[MoPH]. It was the World Bank who attracted the
attention of the Ministry towards PBF” [HM, na-
tional level].
The MoPH was also very receptive to the idea of PBF
because of the experience of providing BPHS services
through NSPs [48] using performance-based contracting
(PBC) in which project payments to NSPs were subject
to satisfactory performance of NSPs on a yearly basis
[49]. The MoPH found the idea of PBF in line with the
MoPH position and idea to be the steward of the health
sector in Afghanistan and allow NSPs to implement the
basic health services on behalf of MoPH (Ministry of
Public Health 2005). Furthermore, PBF, involved the
offer of additional financial resources to the health
Table 1 Research participants
Institution Interviewee Number Reason for Selection
MoPH Deputy Minister of Policy
and Planning
1 Led the negotiation process between MoPH and the donor when deciding on
implementing a PBF programme
PM
GCMU Team Member 2 Managed PBF procurement and financial management PM
HEFD Team Member 2 Coordinated and supervised PBF implementation PM
Provincial Managers 2 Provided key information about the context, content, and implementation of PBF for the
respective provinces
HM
PBF HMIS Team Member 1 Managed PBF reported data from the NSPs on a quarterly basis. HM
Donor Team Member 1 Represented the role and opinions of the donor supporting the PBF programme PM
Third Party Team Member 2 Verified the HMIS data and assessed the performance of PBF in BPHS health facilities by




Provincial Managers 4 Implemented the PBF, monitored implementation, understood the context and content of
the programme
HM
Heads of Health Facilities 4 Views of frontline managers on PBF implementation, its strengths and challenges, their
satisfaction with PBF, and contextual factors
HW
Healthcare Workers 11 Views of frontline workers on PBF implementation, its strengths and challenges, contextual
factors, and their satisfaction with PBF.
HW
MoPH Ministry of Public Health; GCMU Grant and Contract Management Unit: HEFD Health Economics and Financing Directorate; HMIS Health Management and
Information System; NSP non-state provider; PBF Performance-Based Financing; PM Policymaker; HM Health Manager; HW Healthcare Worker
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sector, just prior to presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions scheduled in August 2009 and December 2010.
The fact that PBF offered the means to deploy more re-
sources to mainly rural areas during an election cam-
paign was also of paramount importance.
In a meeting held in November 2008, the Minister of
Health confirmed his decisive support for the adoption
of PBF. The MoPH expected that the PBF could expand
maternal and child services and strengthen health
systems.
“The introduction of PBF is in a critical time when
the country is going through some political and se-
curity turmoil; therefore, the announcement of the
new funding for improving mothers and children
health is considered as good news for people.”
(Ministry of Public Health 2008a).
PBF Programme Actors
The key actors associated with the PBF programme were
the central MoPH, Ministry of Finance (MoF), the WB,
other donors, Provincial Health Offices (PHOs), non-
state providers (NSPs), third party, healthcare workers
including community health workers, and patients/
clients. In this section, the roles of actors and how they
influenced the design and implementation of PBF
programme is presented. Table 2 presents the roles of
PBF programme actors, and Table 3 presents the PBF
programme actors’ matrix.
The MoPH showed interest in PBF and undertook
numerous roles in adopting and managing the PBF
programme. The major entities in the MoPH pertaining
to the PBF programme were the Health Economics and
Financing Directorate (HEFD) which was in charge of
the overall management of the PBF programme; the
Grant and Contract Management Unit (GCMU) which
assumed responsibility for managing the PBF contracts
and disbursing performance payments to implementers;
the Health Information Management Information Unit
(HMIS) which was responsible for the PBF programme
technical reporting; the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit
(M&E) which assumed responsibility for monitoring the
PBF programme; and the PHOs which were in charge of
routine monitoring and provincial level coordination of
the PBF programme.
In our study, the HEFD emerged as a key actor among
the MoPH entities in the context of PBF programme.
The HEFD had established a close relationship with the
Table 2 PBF programme key actors’ role
Actors Roles
MoPH HEFD The MoPH HEFD assumed responsibility for the daily implementation of the PBF programme including monitoring and
preparing yearly reports to track progress on programme implementation. In addition, HEFD cooperated with HMIS in organising
training sessions for managers involved in PBF
GCMU GCMU assumed responsibility for processing and managing contracts for NSPs and for third-party organisations. The GCMU fi-
nance section assumed responsibility for conducting the financial management of the programme such as preparation of pay-
ment orders, fund disbursement, reports, and expenditure statements.
HMIS The MoPH HMIS Unit introduced changes to the HMIS data capture forms to enable its use to monitor PBF. Furthermore, they
led training sessions for the implementers and PHO staff on the new HMIS, NMC, and other PBF-related events. The HMIS also
had to maintain and supply any PBF-related HMIS information and provide reports on the main PBF indicators.
PHO The MoPH PHOs assumed responsibility for ensuring that oversight from the BPHS health facilities was conducted in
coordination with the NSPs. Moreover, the PHOs were responsible for arranging provincial PHCC meetings.
M&E The MoPH M&E Unit assumed responsibility for managing and processing NMC data. The staff of M&E assisted the HEFD with
monitoring activities associated with the PBF.
MoF The MoF was the prime recipient of the PBF fund. The MoF role was to strengthen donor coordination, to ensure accountability
and transparency, and to align donor funding in accordance with the country development objectives. The MoF delegated full
authority in terms of technical decisions and project management to MoPH regarding PBF.
The WB The WB provided financing assistance to PBF programme and played an operational role in appraising and monitoring PBF
programme activities. The WB provided the final approval on the PBF procurement and financial plan, process of contracting
NSPs and third party, the release of funds to implementers, hiring of staff, and adaptation of the design of PBF programme.
Third
Party
The function of the third party was to verify HMIS data and conduct baseline and-end line surveys to evaluate the effect of the
programme. Moreover, the third party had the responsibility for assessing the quality of PBF health facilities.
NSP The NSPs assumed responsibility for implementing the PBF programme in the BPHS health facilities. They were expected to
ensure the availability of quality health services to the people whom they were serving in accordance with their PBF BPHS
contracts, as well as make an accurate record of any unintended effect of PBF on the delivery of health services.
HW The healthcare workers provided health care services to people.
Patient Patients were the prime beneficiary of health care services provided by healthcare workers.
MoPH Ministry of Public Health; HEFD Health Economics and Financing Directorate; GCMU Grant and Contract Management Unit; HMIS Health Management and
Information System; HW Health Worker; PHO Provincial Health Office; M&E Monitoring and Evaluation; MoF Ministry of Finance; PHCC Provincial Health
Coordination Committee; WB World Bank; NSP Non-State Provider; PBF Performance-Based Financing
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MoPH central entities, MoPH PHOs, MoF, the third
party and NSPs, and it served as the first contact point
for coordination with the WB. The PBF National Coord-
inator who was placed in the HEFD was managing the
PBF contracts with NSPs and third party in close coord-
ination with the GCMU. Meanwhile, the PBF project
placed two M&E national consultants, one HMIS na-
tional consultant and one financial management national
consultant in the HEFD. The M&E consultants were
reporting to the Coordinator while the HMIS and finan-
cial management consultants were reporting not only to
the Coordinator but also to HMIS and financial manage-
ment units to ensure the main units of the MoPH were
closely linked to the PBF programme. The MoPH M&E
unit was expected to assist the PBF programme with
monitoring activities. Nevertheless, the function of the
M&E unit was generally limited because the HEFD M&E
national consultants undertook monitoring visits to the
PBF health facilities [HM, national level].
In principle, the function of the PHOs was to serve as
an arm of MoPH in achieving its provincial stewardship
role. However, the role of the PHOs was restricted in
every facet of PBF, including monitoring. The PBF was
managed on a central basis with MoPH maintaining dir-
ect contact with the NSPs. PHOs were engaged with
PBF only in two provinces where the implementation of
BPHS was with the MoPH-SM.
“The PHOs did not actively participate in the imple-
mentation of the PBF. It was obvious that they were
not considered an essential actor in the design and
management of the PBF” [HM, provincial level].
The WB role in PBF programme design, financing
and management was crucial. The PBF programme
was designed by the WB experts given the MoPH
did not have enough expertise in PBF programming
during the design stage. Meanwhile, the WB main-
tained its crucial role in other areas. The WB was
playing an operational role in appraising and super-
vising PBF programme activities. The PBF procure-
ment and financial plan, the procurement process of
contracting NSPs and third party, the release of
funds to implementers, and hiring of staff for the
PBF project all required the approval of the WB
[50]. Some national and provincial managers
expressed the opinion that it was the donor who
made the final decisions on PBF.
“The role of the MoPH in project design and man-
agement did not seem to be as prominent as the
donor was perceived to make all important deci-
sions” [HM, provincial level].
Nevertheless, policymakers at MoPH disagreed with
this contention and emphasised their stewardship func-
tion regarding the management and coordination of
every development projects, including the PBF.
“Overall, the MoPH relationship with the donor was
either to convince or to be convinced” [PM, national
level].
The function of the third party was to verify HMIS
data of the PBF programme and undertake baseline and
end-line surveys to evaluate the effect of the PBF
programme. Moreover, the third party had the responsi-
bility of assessing the quality of PBF health facilities.
Initially, the Johns Hopkins University (JHU) and subse-
quently the KIT Royal Tropical Institute assumed
responsibility for this role in 2013 through a competitive
process. To maintain independence, the third-party role
was limited in the decision-making process, although
health managers felt that this party could have taken a
Table 3 PBF programme actor matrix
Actors Role Power Interest Idea
Central MoPH Policymaker Powerful in terms of position & veto player Interested Supportive
World Bank Donor/
Policymaker
Powerful in terms of having money and
expertise
Very much interested Supportive
Ministry of
Finance
Policymaker Veto player Interested Supportive
Third Party
Organisation
Evaluator Neutral Neutral Neutral


















Not powerful but can influence the
implementation of services
Interested Supportive
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more active role in the design stage as well as in improv-
ing the programme implementation.
The MoF was the prime recipient of PBF funds. The
MoF role was to strengthen donor coordination, to en-
sure the accountability and transparency of aid assist-
ance including the PBF, and to align donor funding in
accordance with the country development objectives.
However, the MoF did not participate in the design and
management of the PBF programme as the MoF dele-
gated full authority to MoPH for financial management,
programme choices and implementation.
“The MoPH was regularly updating the MoF on the
PBF progress. Also, the World Bank had regular
meetings with the MoF. Overall, the MoF never in-
terfered in the PBF issues” [HM, national level].
The implementers (NSPs and MoPH-SM) assumed re-
sponsibility for implementing the PBF programme in the
BPHS health facilities. Nevertheless, the NSPs function
in the design of PBF was limited. On the other hand, the
implementers perceived the PBF programme to be a
burden because they gained no advantage while being
under significant pressure to provide timely HMIS re-
ports to MoPH and timely incentive payments to health
facilities.
“Trust me it [PBF] was a good programme but a
nightmare for us (NSPs), a lot of work!” [HM, provin-
cial level].
Healthcare workers were the principal service pro-
viders in the BPHS health facilities. Although their role
in the design of PBF was limited, and they were not in-
volved in the policy decision-making process, most of
them were satisfied with the PBF programme. They gave
two reasons for this. Firstly, the PBF performance incen-
tive was simply an extra payment to support their
current standard of living. Our finding elsewhere shows
that performance payments amounted almost the same
level of their monthly salaries [35]. Secondly, health
workers regarded performance payments as a sign of
appreciation from their supervisors and a reward for effi-
cient work.
“Life is very expensive nowadays. The incentive I
receive has changed my life. I am really happy!
[HW, health facility level]
On the other hand, although healthcare workers knew
of the PBF objectives and expected outcomes, they mis-
interpreted the notion of allocating the health facilities
into intervention and control groups. The majority of
staff at control facilities were of the opinion that if they
improved their performance, they could be entitled to
incentive payments in the near future. National-level
health managers believed that the provincial managers
intentionally disseminated such messages to control fa-
cility staff to encourage them to work harder to improve
the overall performance of BPHS implementation.
“The provincial managers kept promising control
health facilities to provide them incentives if they
show better performance” [HM, national level].
The implementers (NSPs, MoPH-SM) had to prepare
written agreements with each health facility and define
the prices of indicators and the proportion of allocation
of incentives among the health facility staff. Initially, this
was based on healthcare worker input and discussion.
However, this was a matter of dispute in some health fa-
cilities. For instance, midwives attempted to justify the
significance of their services. By contrast, other staff of
health facilities, especially doctors, were of the opinion
that midwives were dependent on their cooperation in
order to provide services. In other cases, auxiliary staff
were excluded from incentive payments, with detrimen-
tal consequences for service utilisation in some
instances.
“We noticed that our OPD [outpatient department]
visits were decreasing day by day. We discovered
that the guards, who were the first point of contact
in the clinic, were misleading the patients. As soon
as the guards were included in the PBF incentive list,
the number of OPD patients increased” [HW, health
facility level].
Therefore, the managers (NSPs and MoPH-SM) subse-
quently defined incentive allocation schemes without the
consent of healthcare workers and imposed it on some
health facilities.
Some key cadres were not considered for the incentive
payments, such as community health workers (CHWs)
who had responsibility for the provision of basic pre-
ventive and promotive services to between 100 and 150
households and referring patients from community to
health facilities.
“CHWs are the first point of contact for patients at
the community level. Frankly, they have enough
influence in the community. People usually listen to
what they say” [HW, health facility level].
PBF Implementation process
To authorize the PBF programme, a memorandum of
understanding (MoU) was signed in 2008 between the
MoPH and the WB [51]. A further financial agreement
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between the Ministry of Finance and the WB was signed
in 2009 [52]. To support PBF implementation, the WB
pledged 12 million US dollars grant which was utilised
in six years. Negotiations between the MoPH and the
WB on the management structure of PBF commenced
in 2009. To furnish MoPH officials with details of the
PBF such as the design and management of the
programme, the WB encouraged discussions with the
WB experts who had experience from the PBF in
Rwanda.
In 2009, the MoPH initiated a working group to ad-
dress the PBF requirement for health systems to be
strengthened and to identify target provinces for the im-
plementation of the PBF programme. The working
group recognised the urgent need to strengthen the
HMIS, monitoring and evaluation systems and financial
management. Given that PBF required close monitoring;
the working group recommended to implement PBF
only in provinces where the level of security was good.
Two provinces were selected as pilot sites for three
months in early 2010 to identify potential administrative
challenges prior to roll out [53]. As no major challenges
were encountered, the PBF programme was subse-
quently rolled out to the remaining 9 provinces by 2011.
In the initial stage, orientation sessions were also offered
to BPHS implementers and provincial health officers to
acquaint them with the principal features of the PBF
programme.
Furthermore, the MoPH signed contracts with NSPs in
nine provinces where they implemented the PBF programme
in BPHS health facilities, and with the Johns Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health (JHU) as a third-party in-
stitution to verify the HMIS data and assess the PBF
programme. Additionally, the MoPH assumed responsibility
for implementing PBF in two MoPH-SM provinces [37].
In order for incentives to be paid, reported activity
had to be verified by a third party. To this end,
health facility HMIS data on target indicators were
provided quarterly to MoPH. The verification of
HMIS data occurred on a three-monthly basis be-
tween 2010 and 2013 and a six-monthly basis after-
wards on a random selection of health facilities.
Facility HMIS data were compared to data in facility
registers. In addition, five households for each indi-
cator were interviewed by the third party to verify
that the services had been provided. In order to re-
ceive incentives, the facility validation rate had to
exceed 90 per cent, and the community validation
rate exceed 80 per cent. The incentive payments
were weighted according to quality of care, which
was assessed by a quarterly score on the national
monitoring checklist (Fig. 1). In addition to facility-
level incentive payments, PBF performance payments
were also paid to NSPs and MoPH provincial health
officers. It was anticipated that NSPs would receive
10 per cent of the performance payment paid to fa-
cilities for management purposes: this would be paid
at a provincial level. The objective of this allocation
was to help implementers manage the operational
activity associated with the PBF. Besides, it was an-
ticipated that provincial health officers would receive
performance payments to enhance the stewardship
function of the provincial MoPH associated with the
PBF. Provincial health officers were paid based on
the number of health facilities in provinces they
monitored PBF programme quarterly, number of re-
corded minutes from the Provincial Health Coordin-
ation Committee (PHCC) meetings (held quarterly
among actors at the provincial level) and the propor-
tion of activities implemented from the provincial
quarterly work plan. However, the allocation of man-
agement funds to implementers as well as the pay-
ments to provincial health officers was discontinued
in the second year of the PBF programme. This may
have occurred due to difficulties managing payments
to NSPs and assessing the performance of provincial
health officers [54].
The level of incentive to be paid for services at the
facility-level was based on the respective burden of dis-
ease, the potential to increase coverage, the cost of ser-
vice delivery in the private market, and the availability of
funds. However, initially, incentives were low, but it was
increased during the second year of the PBF
implementation.
“The data shows that the total amount of incentive
earned by each health facility in the last three quar-
ters is too small. Discussion with implementers has
revealed that this is partly due to the unit price
amount which is too small to motivate the health
workers. It is agreed to revise the prices of the out-
puts” [55].
The facility-level incentives were paid based on extra
use of services above the baseline for the services. There-
fore, the baselines for each indicator were fixed for each
health facility according to the 2009 average HMIS data.
It soon became apparent that the baseline had been set
too high due to the inaccuracy of HMIS data in 2009.
Consequently, this was amended in 2011 by applying the
HMIS 2010 average data.
“Implementing organisations expressed concern that
the baseline against which performance is assessed is
set too high. It is agreed to revisit the baseline” [55].
It was anticipated that PBF performance payments
would be available to implementers every six months,
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whereas implementers were meant to incentivise health-
care workers every three months. However, lengthy de-
lays occurred in making payments to both implementers
and healthcare workers.
“We were told that we would receive incentives each
quarter, but this was not the case. Sometimes the de-
lays were so long that we could forget about the PBF
incentives” [HW, health facility level].
There were many reasons for the delays, including fi-
nancial bureaucratic processes within the government
and delaying the release of funds, implementers submit-
ting HMIS reports late, and third-party submitting veri-
fication reports to MoPH late. In 2011, the fund delay
for PBF health facilities was for three quarters. As a re-
sult, the MoPH decided to make the incentive payments
to health facilities without verification of HMIS data.
“Last year’s findings regarding third party verifica-
tion showed 95 per cent accuracy of data. Therefore,
the incentives should be paid on the basis of the pre-
vious year’s report to avoid further delays in per-
formance payments.” [53].
The verification process was found to be too resource-
intensive and cumbersome. The third party faced chal-
lenges identifying households in the community from fa-
cility registers due to incorrect names and addresses.
Furthermore, recall bias was a challenge with
households.
“When a monitor asked a woman whether she had
visited the health facility, she was confused in her
understanding of which services she had received
during her visit from the health facility. In most
cases, the patient cards were not available at the
household level, or they contained incomplete infor-
mation which made it impossible for community
monitors to verify the services.” [HM, national level].
Some of the managers and healthcare workers argued
that PBF could have worked efficiently with fully func-
tional health facilities. Consequently, they felt it would
have been better to spend some of the funding of PBF
on inputs such as medicine, staff training, equipment,
and supplies, all of which were needed by the BPHS
health facilities.
“We found ourselves handcuffed by the insufficient
availability of pharmaceuticals, dysfunctional [med-
ical] equipment, and lack of, particularly female
healthcare workers. I wish the PBF could have
helped” [HM, provincial level].
The managers also expressed a stronger preference for
the demand side-financing programme. They argued
that this would have brought greater benefits as they be-
lieved that the key reason for the low utilisation of ser-
vices was high transportation costs and poor road
quality.
“In extremely impoverished communities, where
geographical and financial access is limited, a
complementary strategy of cash vouchers allowing
women to access antenatal care and facility deliv-
eries would have resulted in a better outcome”
[HM, national level].
Table 4 presents the PBF programme lifetime timeline.
Discussion
PBF programmes are inherently political as they enforce
distinct arrangements for the sharing of resources, and
represents a risk or opportunity to actors as a result of
changes to their roles and responsibilities and the modi-
fication of organisational processes [26]. However, des-
pite widespread implementation of PBF programmes in
LMICs, there has been minimal use of political economy
analysis to shed light on why PBF is adopted, and how it
is designed and implemented, including why it may not
work as planned.
This study highlighted the main dynamics that influ-
enced the adoption, design and implementation of PBF
programme in Afghanistan from the lens of political
economy.
Contextual factors
It was found that a number of contextual factors sup-
ported the adoption of PBF in Afghanistan. In general,
PBF is seen as a means of achieving global policy goals,
initially MDGs 4 and 5 and later UHC. A lot of coun-
tries, especially low-income and FCAS were implement-
ing PBF [56] which supported policy uptake in
Afghanistan. Besides, Afghanistan embarked on PBF
based on the successful implementation of PBF in
Rwanda context. Likewise, PBF was seen as an oppor-
tunity to improve the provision of healthcare services
rapidly. PBF thus aligned well with donors and the
Afghan government’s wish to produce fast results.
Meanwhile, the strategic importance of promoting policy
ideas that go with financial support is quite aligned with
the interest and idea of donors in PBF. Donors are
mostly concerned about achieving their results-oriented
programme. Therefore, they see PBF as a suitable
programme given it involves the establishment of orga-
nised, accountable, and traceable reporting system [56].
In Afghanistan, the promise of PBF financial resources
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came at a time when Afghanistan was encountering not
only poor health indicators but also a lack of financial
resources to upgrade the country’s health system. This
finding is in line with other health systems performance
studies that the availability of funding was a key factor
influencing health policy uptake in LMICs [57, 58]. On
the influence of wider political economy constraints,
availability of adequate inputs such as drugs, supplies,
staff training and equipment remain essential to produce
health outcomes [59]. In Afghanistan’s PBF programme
focused on results, while sufficient inputs were not pro-
vided to health facilities. This finding is similar to those
of other studies showing that insufficient inputs in
health facilities significantly influence the effectiveness
of PBF programmes [59, 60]. In Burundi, the PBF
programme enjoyed sufficient funds for inputs from
input-based payment that led to a better performance of
PBF programme [61]. In contrast, in Rwanda, the PBF
programme did not prove to be pro-poor due to the in-
sufficient inputs in health facilities to meet the needs of
the poorer segment of the population [62].
Power Dynamics
The policy process underlying the design and implemen-
tation of the PBF programme in Afghanistan was a result
of power dynamics and interactions between PBF
programme actors. The exercise of power occurs not only
between actors usually considered powerful, such as
donors, but also actors who were influential in specific
local settings such as PHOs, NSPs and health facility
workers. The PBF programme established a centralised
management structure to have more control on resources.
Though this arrangement posed the MoPH and the donor
in a strong position to manage the PBF programme
through a ‘single-window system’, it compromised the no-
tion of institutional embedding which required the en-
gagement of all relevant units in managing the
programme to prevent any drawbacks. For example, in
Uganda, inattention to the role of some key actors par-
tially led to the failure of the programme [63]. In addition,
having inadequate knowledge of PBF programming, the
MoPH allowed extensive external assistance in the design
stage of the PBF programme which led to a flawed design
such as focusing only on supply-side financing without
assessing the need for a demand-side financing
programme. Several surveys in Afghanistan highlighted
the need for a demand-side financing programme, espe-
cially addressing the high cost of transportation to access
care [64–66]. Furthermore, the donor had maintained
control over the PBF programme procurement and finan-
cial decisions during the implementation stage that com-
promised the notion of local ownership. In this context,
the PHOs and NSPs were publicly showing their interest
in PBF while privately they assumed it as a burden without
gaining an advantage. The findings of the present study
are similar to those of other researchers, which affirm the
Table 4 PBF programme timeline
Date Main Feature
July 2008 Afghanistan National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment report 2007/2008 released. The report highlighted that only 37 % of children
received full immunisation, CPR was 15 %, 36 % ANC use, and 24 % SBA use. The cost of transportation was indicated as the main
barrier to access health facilities by women and children.
September
2008
A preliminary MoU signed between MoPH and WB to adopt PBF.
April 2009 Health financing and sustainability policy and strategy developed and highlighted the need for supply and demand-side financing
October 2009 Financial agreement on PBF signed between the WB and Afghan MoF. The WB pledged 12 million US dollars grant to be used by
the PBF programme.
Early 2010 PBF programme pilot started in two provinces (Panjshir and Samangan)
September
2010




PBF workshop conducted to orient the PHOs and NSPs on the PBF objectives, mechanism of implementation, expected outputs and
outcomes. The participants were managers from the MoPH and NSPs.
June 2011 PBF baseline survey submitted to MoPH




PBF unit cost of services modified. PBF national workshop conducted to present HMIS updates.
February 2013 PBF workshop conducted to discuss about monitoring findings, implementation challenges, 3rd party verification results,
implementation challenges and way forward. The participants were managers from the MoPH and NSPs.
Early 2016 PBF end line survey 2015 submitted to MoPH
CPR Contraceptive Prevalence Rate; ANC Antenatal Care; SBA Skilled Birth Attendance; MoU Memorandum of Understanding; PBF Performance-Based Financing;
WB World Bank; PHOs Provincial Health Offices; HMIS Health Management Information System; MoPH Ministry of Public Health; NSPs Non-State Providers
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role of donors in numerous cases with regard to setting
agendas [67] as well influencing the decision-making pro-
cesses with regard to health financing policies in LMICs
[68]. The overriding influence of donors could lead to
frustration and mistrust between donors and recipient
countries, as witnessed in the context of the PBF
programme in other countries [28]. In Tanzania, the PBF
policy process was politicised with outside actors having
considerable influence on the agenda, thus allowing min-
imal flexibility for the Tanzanian authorities to effectively
lead the process [28]. PBF can be successful if actors take
on responsibility for the programme. Kiendrebeogo and
Meesen [69] suggest that all actors should assume joint
ownership of a new programme as each could possess
knowledge that is essential. The feeling of ownership
should be engendered nationally in order that all relevant
actors can value and conform to the programme. The pro-
cesses of interaction with actors and the implementation
approach should retain flexibility, thus providing time for
the development of ownership and local capacity, and to
enable integration within the health system [30]. There-
fore, the country where PBF is implemented should make
sure (i) to advocate for support from political individuals
and institutions for the PBF programme and ensure local
actors are engaged in formulating and adapting design to
the local context [70]; (ii) to engage frontline healthcare
workers, especially in the design process of PBF. On the
basis of the Street-Level Bureaucrats model developed by
Michael Lipsky [71], as frontline public workers (so-called
street bureaucrats) are responsible for implementing pub-
lic policies, they are capable of reshaping the policies
based on their own interests and principles; hence, it is
critical that their ideas are incorporated into the policies
to facilitate effective implementation. For example, the in-
volvement of community health workers in the design and
implementation of PBF in Afghanistan could have im-
proved the overall performance of the PBF programme;
and (iii) to balance the influence of donors. Donors bring
money that generally affords them a dominant position
within policymaking processes and implementation.
Nevertheless, money is not the only vehicle through which
decisions can be influenced. Holding a critical position
and possessing technical expertise are the two other key
factors that enable actors to assume a powerful position.
Hence, the MoPH could augment its ability to amalgam-
ate its key role with technical expertise to strengthen its
level of influence, and ensure programme designs are
adapted to the local context [72].
Path dependency
The MoPH support for PBF adoption was partly linked
to their past positive experience of performance-based
contracting. In political economy, this is called path de-
pendency, the notion that a new policy is shaped by the
policy choices of the past [73]. However, while path de-
pendency can influence policy choice, the capacity of an
organisation in implementing a new policy is equally
vital. In Thailand where the population enjoy universal
health coverage, in addition to path dependency, it was
the management capacity that facilitated the process of
implementing related health financing reforms [74]. In
Afghanistan, the health system lacked an adequate cap-
acity to manage the PBF programme on a large scale.
Thus, the PBF programme encountered implementation
challenges such as delays in HMIS reports and pay-
ments, challenges in data verification, disagreement
about the distribution of incentives among health facility
staff, and misunderstanding of the concept of PBF in
control health facilities. As demonstrated in Burundi and
Rwanda, national level management capacity, especially
in human resources for health, was an essential enabler
to scaling up PBF programmes at the national level,
whereas Kenya’s insufficient management capacity sig-
nificantly affected the expansion of the PBF programme
[11]. Therefore, it is highly important to ensure adapt-
ability and responsiveness of the PBF programme design
to the local context, and the availability of the local cap-
acity to manage the implementation of RBF [75].
Limitations
Specific methodological weaknesses in our study also
need to be acknowledged. Firstly, the interviews were
conducted retrospectively. Thus, participants were asked
to recollect events that happened in the past and this
may have led to recall bias. To mitigate the risk of recall
bias, some methodological approaches such as selecting
informed participants were considered, giving the study
participants enough time to think before answering the
questions and using a standardised and well-structured
questionnaire. Secondly, data analysis was done only by
the PI. Though this could have introduced bias, the find-
ings were triangulated with PBF documents to the extent
possible. Thirdly, the study PI was working for the Min-
istry of Public Health in a senior position during the life-
time of the PBF programme and his opinion might have
biased the study findings. On the other hand, his in-
depth understanding from the local context, familiarity
with the local languages, and having smooth access to
senior level actors benefited this study. Fourthly, this
study did not include service users (patients). Future
studies could consider the inclusion of service users to
understand to what extent PBF is in line with their
needs. Fifthly, our case study was limited to the BPHS;
the discussion on PBF could have been expanded to the
Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) in
Afghanistan. Future PEAs could therefore include EPHS
within the scope of their research to portray the picture
of PBF in secondary healthcare services in Afghanistan,
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which may differ from primary care. Lastly, patient and
the public were not involved in the design and other
stages of this study. However, it is planned to dissemin-
ate the findings through publication and poster and oral
presentations in conferences and public events.
Conclusions
This study shows that successful implementation of PBF
programmes needs alignment with political economy
factors. In a situation in which PBF programmes are
adapted according to the local context, and the interac-
tions between actors are well managed in all stages of
the policy cycle, a PBF programme can meet its objec-
tives successfully. In Afghanistan, political economy fac-
tors played a critical role in the introduction, design and
implementation of PBF programme. Future studies
should focus on conducting empirical research to not
only understand the multiple effects of PBF programmes
on the performance of health systems but also the main
political economy dynamics that influence the PBF pro-
grammes in different stages of the policy process. This
will facilitate the design and implementation of an ef-
fective and flexible PBF model, adapted to the local con-
text and owned by the country. If PBF programmes are
designed around a full understanding of political econ-
omy, PBF can potentially be a powerful tool to achieve
better outcomes. Further use of political economy ana-
lysis in such studies is recommended.
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